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Abstract 
 
 
This Working Paper explores the likely impact on the safety and quality of NHS provision 
in the light of the likely Government response to the issues the Inquiry has indicated it 
will be making recommendations on. The Inquiry Report will be handed to Secretary of 
State Jeremy Hunt in early January 2013 and he will then respond, though it is unclear 
when. The Inquiry Chair has made clear the issues he is likely to make recommendations 
on, and the closing written and verbal submissions from the lead counsel to the Inquiry, 
Tom Kark QC, give a good steer on what those recommendations are likely to include. 
The Inquiry Report is widely regarded as being the most important such Report for a 
decade and comes amid unprecedented turmoil in the NHS The recommendations and 
the Government response to them are likely to significantly define important policy 
issues, political disagreements and discussion about the future role of the providing, 
commissioning, supervisory and regulatory bodies. 
This paper provides a “Risk rating” of the main areas of the likely Inquiry 
recommendations based on an assessment of the impact that the likely government 
response will have on care quality and patient safety. 
Red indicates serious adverse consequences 
Amber indicates moderate adverse consequences 
Green indicates no adverse consequences 
 
This Paper concludes that there will remain serious risks for many of the issues likely to 
be highlighted by the Inquiry Report if Government response is as may be reasonably 
forecast. 
The paper has three sections. 
The introduction sets the Inquiry report in context. 
The main section considers the central issues that the Inquiry is likely to make 
recommendations about. 
The final section considers concerns not directly considered by the Inquiry but which are 
regarded as impacting on the implementation of its recommendations. 
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The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry Report. 
What it is likely to say and the Government’s likely response: a 
risk assessment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
On 9 June 2010, Andrew Lansley MP, then Secretary of State for Health, announced a 
public inquiry into the role of the commissioning, supervisory and regulatory bodies in 
the monitoring of Mid Staffordshire Foundation NHS Trust. In January 2013 its chair, 
Robert Francis QC, is due to hand over his report to the Minister. 
This second inquiry follows the earlier independent inquiry (also chaired by Robert 
Francis QC) into the care provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.1 (Robert 
Francis, 2010) 
 
The second report may well propose fundamental changes to the commissioning, 
supervisory and regulatory arrangements in an attempt to ensure that all reasonable and 
necessary steps are taken to ensure such failings do not happen again. This Working 
Paper explores, ahead of this second and final report being published: 
• what those recommendations are likely to be,  
• what the Government response is likely to be, and  
• whether, as a result, all reasonable and necessary steps will actually be taken to 
ensure such failings do not happen again. 
Context and significance 
The scale of harm caused by the failings in Mid Staffordshire Foundation NHS Trust was 
stunning. Between 400 and 1200 people died who need not have done. Repeatedly 
negligent care and systematic breaches of patient dignity took place between 2005 and 
2009. Every single agency, or group of staff, whose responsibility it was to raise 
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concerns, identify poor care and harm, and act to prevent it either failed to do so 
entirely, or did so ineffectively.2 (Robert Francis, 2010) The Inquiry Chair concluded by 
saying: 
 
As I have remarked at some of the seminars, there seems to me to be a tide of 
public anger about what has happened. I think this can only be assuaged by 
identification and implementation of measures which patients and the public are 
satisfied have a good chance of achieving this. 
The NHS has a budget of £100bn, employs 1.3 million people in 59 specialties and 
makes contact with one million patients every 36 hours. Such a massive undertaking is 
bound to make mistakes from time to time. The tragedy of Mid Staffordshire Hospital 
was the scale of the mistakes made, over an extended period, without anyone raising 
concerns and taking action.  
In 2009, an inquiry by the Healthcare Commission highlighted three major shortcomings 
at Mid Staffordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. It identified a lack of transparency, 
a tolerance of poor practice and a systematic denial of its problems alongside poor 
nursing leadership, insufficient skilled staff, poor risk assessments and serious defects in 
board level governance. The first Francis Inquiry report came to similar conclusions but 
linked it directly to its obsession with attaining Trust status. It described a systematic 
failure of good care.3 (Healthcare Commission, March 2009.)  
 
This Working Paper will consider many of the issues the Inquiry Chair says he will 
consider in his recommendations, cognisant that several of those recommendations may 
well be ones that Ministers might be deeply unhappy about.  
Indeed NHS chief executive Sir David Nicholson has already expressed his concerns that  
Recommendations from the Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust public inquiry run 
a “very real” risk of conflicting with government policy.4 (Sarah Calkin. 29 May 
2012).   
The list of topics upon which the Inquiry Chair stated he was likely to make 
recommendations (Fig 1) gives a sense of the scale of failure.5 (Public Inquiry.9th 
December 2011).  
 
 
5 
 
 
Fig. 1.The main issues likely to be addressed in the Final Report 
1. Recruitment, standards, training and regulation of healthcare support workers. 
2. The recruitment, standards and training of registered nurses. 
3. The training and qualification of those charged with caring for the elderly. 
4. The recruitment, training, support and regulation of senior managers of NHS 
organisations. 
5. The standards applicable to healthcare generally. 
6. The exercise of the fitness to practise functions of professional regulatory bodies. 
7. The engagement of healthcare generally in the leadership and management of 
their organisations. 
8. The nature of standards set for the safety and quality of care, and which 
organisation or organisations should have the responsibility for setting and 
enforcing them. 
9. The relevance of staffing levels and skill mix to those standards. 
10. The interface between the regulation of governance, finance, and quality and 
safety standards. 
11. The use of commissioning to require and monitor safety and quality standards or 
provision. 
12. Methods of monitoring and enforcing those standards. 
13. The potential adverse consequence of structural reorganisations and the 
requirements for addressing these. 
14. The role of foundation trust governors and members, and other local public, 
patient and staff representatives. 
15. The nature, scope and definition of a duty of candour and methods of enforcing it. 
16. The involvement of external agencies in the complaints process and the use of 
information from it. 
17. The obligations of disclosure to and obtaining of evidence by coroners. 
18. The means of embedding the patient voice throughout the system. 
19. The development, collection, use and sharing of information and data, including 
safety alerts, mortality data and performance indicators. 
20. And the protection of whistle-blowers. 
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A central issue: was Mid Staffordshire’s failing a unique event? 
Central to the evidence provided by some witnesses from the DH and NHS West 
Midlands had been the assertion that what happened in Mid Staffordshire was a unique 
event and not a systemic failure. DH officials disagreed on whether there had been a 
“whole system failure”. On 27th September Sir Hugh Taylor, former permanent secretary 
said he thought it was, whereas the day before Una O’Brien, the current permanent 
secretary, told the inquiry it wasn’t. 6 (Public Inquiry.26th and 27th September 2011)  
Counsel to the Inquiry, Tom Kark QC, described the latter suggestion as “dangerous” 
and responded by saying “frankly [that] is a naive assumption and one which places 
reliance on a regulatory system which has been demonstrated to have failed in a 
significant way.” He went on: 
290. ….reports produced in 2008 for the purposes of Lord Darzi’s review 
demonstrate that key features of the Trust’s failure (to implement the principles 
of clinical governance) were replicated to a significant degree more broadly 
across the NHS….The tendency within the DH to view Mid Staffs as an isolated 
example is a dangerous one.  
In his concluding remarks Robert Francis QC stated 
While we have sat here, serious concerns have surfaced elsewhere in various 
reports to which I have been referred. Many of them have disturbing echoes of 
what happened here……To the extent that it was ever thought to be the case, I do 
not think anyone now maintains that at least some of the appalling experiences of 
which I have heard are unique to Stafford.7 (Public Inquiry. 28th November 2011) 
Many NHS Trust Chief Executives seem to share his view: 
Nearly half of hospital chief executives believe regulators and the NHS 
governance system would miss a Mid Staffordshire-style care scandal if it 
occurred today.8 (Ben Clover 25 July, 2012). 
Indeed whilst the Inquiry was taking evidence, similar (though on a smaller scale) 
fundamental organisation-wide failures were reported at Morecombe Bay NHS Trust9 
(CQC. 2012) and Winterbourne View10 (Margaret Flynn. 2012) with many similar 
characteristics. Mid Staffordshire’s failings closely followed those at Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust where up to 90 patients died between April 2004 and 
September 2006 following a major infectious outbreak of Clostridium.11 (Healthcare 
Commission. January 2009).  
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It is worth noting that whilst the focus of the Inquiry has been on failings at acute 
hospitals, almost everything it is likely to say applies equally to mental health and 
primary care and, indeed, to much of social care. 
Anthony Sumara, the Chief Executive sent into Mid Staffordshire to replace the disgraced 
former chief executive Martin Yeates told fellow managers: 
In many ways this summer has been a warning that we must not let the 
outcomes of this Inquiry suffer the fate of so many others that are shelved and 
never implemented. Too much is at stake. Even at the NHS Confederation 
conference this year, from a straw poll of over 150 senior NHS managers, two 
thirds admitted they have not read the original Francis report. (This is despite a 
letter from David Nicholson to every organisation in the NHS instructing them to 
read and act on its recommendations).12 (Antony Sumara, 5 September 2011). 
The scale of the challenge facing the NHS was suggested when, despite the strenuous 
efforts made to change the culture and governance of Mid Staffordshire, just one year 
after this speech a peer review of breast cancer surgery services at Mid Staffordshire 
Foundation Trust uncovered a catalogue of concerns and safety fears, despite the trust 
assessing them as being largely compliant with national standards. While the Trust’s 
self-assessment said the services were almost 94 per cent compliant with standards 
drawn up by the National Cancer Action Team peer review programme, the team’s peer 
review said they were just 9.7 per cent compliant.13 (Shaun Lintern. (11 September 
2012).   
On the basis of the Inquiry hearings it seems unlikely that this Inquiry will repeat the 
failings of the Clothier Inquiry established following the Beverley Allitt scandal in which it 
was widely held that, though the inquiry was thorough, it failed to address wider policy 
concerns, in particular the extent to which that scandal was a unique event driven by 
circumstances particular to one hospital rather than symptomatic of wider systemic 
failings.14 (Nick Davies. February 1994).   
It is eleven years since Professor Ian Kennedy completed his landmark Inquiry Report 
into the deaths of children at Bristol Royal Infirmary15 (Professor Ian Kennedy. July 
2001). The Mid Staffordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry Final report is likely 
to conclude that crucial measures recommended then but not acted upon effectively 
must be taken: 
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“In particular, it (the NHS) must promote openness and the preparedness to 
acknowledge errors and to learn lessons. Healthcare professionals should have a 
duty of candour to patients. Clinical negligence litigation, as a barrier to 
openness, should be abolished. Safe care should be promoted and led by a non-
executive member of every trust board………To give effect to the following 
(amongst others): 
o The patient must be at the centre of everything which the NHS 
does. 
o The commitment and the dedication of staff in the NHS must be 
valued and acknowledged: those caring for patients must themselves be 
supported and cared for. 
o There must be openness and transparency in everything which the 
NHS does. 
o The impact of the way in which services are organised on the 
quality of care which patients receive must be recognised: the quality of 
care depends on systems and on facilities, as well as on individual 
healthcare professionals. 
o The safety of patients must be the foundation of the NHS's 
commitment to the quality of its services. 
o Sentinel events, that is, errors, other adverse events, and near 
misses, which occur during the care of patients, must be seen as 
opportunities to learn, not just as reasons to blame. 
o There must be clear and understood systems of responsibility and 
accountability: a culture of blame is no substitute for such systems. 
o The quality of healthcare must be guided by agreed standards, 
compliance with which is regularly monitored.” 
 
No healthcare system can rely on human perfection. Errors are inevitable. The challenge 
is to balance a no blame approach to clinical errors with the need for individual, 
managerial and organisational accountability. 
It is important to distinguish between the human error, at risk behaviour and reckless 
behaviour. Approaches such as the NPSA Incident Decision Tree seek to distinguish 
between human errors and more systematic or deep rooted causes, an approach now 
widely adopted.16 (NPSA. February 2004). 
When patient safety breaks down it is usually caused by clinical systems and 
processes rather than individuals…..the leader’s job is (to help) create an 
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environment in which people are given the right tools for doing their jobs and are 
so comfortable with their role in the organisation that they hold themselves 
accountable.” 17(Robert Wachter. 2012).   
The promotion of good care and prevention of serious failures of quality depends on: 
  
• frontline professional staff who have a duty of care towards those they care for  
• boards and senior managers within health care providers who have a duty of care 
towards their staff and patients  
• the external systems for assuring the public about the quality of care provided 
• government who provide the policy framework and funding within which care is 
provided 
 
It is unclear to what extent the Inquiry Report will address the latter issue. Failure to do 
so could fundamentally undermine it. 
 
A flurry of initiatives followed the First Inquiry report, some of which were set out in the 
NHS Chief Executive’s letter to all Trust Chief Executives of  24 February 201018 (Sir 
David Nicholson. 24 February 2010) in which he reminded recipients that “both  the 
Government and the Trust have accepted all of the recommendations from Robert 
Francis. “ and listed various initiatives including: 
• a requirement to publish Quality Accounts 
• accepting the recommendations of or a report recommending a new system of 
professional accreditation for senior managers  
 
• revised guidance on board governance  
 
• a working group involving key parties and leading academics and they have 
committed to develop a single hospital standardised mortality ratio (HSMR) for 
the NHS. He has also asked the NHS Confederation to develop a practical guide to 
the use and interpretation of HSMRs for the NHS 
 
• publishing a report19 (National Quality Board. 2010) into early warning systems, 
which sought to set out very clearly what the respective roles and responsibilities 
of each and every NHS organisation were in preventing failure.  
 
He concluded by stating: 
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This is particularly important as we enter a period of tougher economic 
circumstances and it is why I have stressed that our approach to increasing 
productivity must be driven by the desire to improve quality. 
 
However, we now know (see above) from Anthony Sumara that two thirds of Trust Chief 
Executives did not even read the First Inquiry Report. 
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The main issues the Inquiry Report is likely to make 
recommendations about 
 
 
1. Recruitment, standards, training and regulation of 
healthcare support workers. 
 
Both the Nursing and Midwifery Council and the Royal College of Nursing strongly 
support the regulation of healthcare support workers considering this necessary for the 
protection of the public. The Inquiry seems well disposed to the idea, with its Counsel, 
Tom Kark QC, stating: 
 
311. The Inquiry should consider the case for the regulation of healthcare support 
workers. It appears to be a surprising and potentially dangerous lacuna that there 
is a complete lack of regulation of a sizeable number of those who work in the 
health service and have direct contact with the sick and vulnerable. There is at 
present an unjustifiable distinction between the lack of regulation applied to such 
individuals and the full regulatory regime applied to nurses. 
The DH are opposed to such regulation, referring to its size and complexity.When it was 
put to Sir David Nicholson that the Royal College of Nursing chief executive Peter Carter 
and Nursing and Midwifery Council boss Dickon Weir-Hughes believed HCAs should be 
regulated, he replied “the nursing profession would say that wouldn’t they”. 
When asked by Robert Francis QC how much time he therefore thought should be given 
to ensure that the people generally “charged with feeding and providing basic care to our 
most vulnerable patients are fit and proper people to do that?” Sir David Nicholson 
responded by referring to the need for proper supervision but was unable to think of 
anything the DH was doing nationally to improve the situation.20 (Public Inquiry. 8th Sept 
2011). 
The same day, Dame Christine Beasley agreed, arguing the cost and effort was not 
“proportionate” to any benefits. When pressed by inquiry chairman Robert Francis QC if 
she had changed her mind since she recommended regulation for HCAs as a member of 
the Prime Minister’s Commission into Nursing, she stated there might be a case for 
regulating a higher level of HCA but not the whole workforce.21 (Public Inquiry. 8th Sept 
2011) 
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Ministers made clear their view clear in deciding to reject the Commons’ Health Select 
Committee recommendation to introduce compulsory regulation for healthcare assistants 
just weeks before the Inquiry Report was due 22 (DH. September 2012). Ministers argued 
that “(the) case has not yet been made for imposing further statutory [HCA] regulation”, 
but have produced no evidence to counter that heard at both the Select Committee and 
the Inquiry  
By contrast, Hilary Jones, dean of Staffordshire University’s Faculty of Health, told the 
Inquiry that some senior trust managers appeared happy to replace skilled caregivers 
with a largely untrained workforce, believing that this would have no effect on care and 
that “codes of practice, professional values and ethical standards were all sacrificed”. 
She said there was a danger that opting for untrained workers turned nursing into a set 
of tasks undertaken by rule-following operatives, creating a culture of mediocrity.23 
(Public Inquiry, 2 November. 2011). 
 
Government policy towards the regulation of health care assistants is probably best 
understood in the context of the Government zeal for deregulation as set out in Equity 
and excellence: Liberating the NHS
24
 (DH, 2010) and by reflecting on DH policy towards 
the regulation of social care support workers. This latter group had previously expected 
regulation but this was then dropped25 (CHRE. September 2009). More recently, the 
White Paper ‘Building the National Care Service’ 26 (DH, 2010) has been accompanied by 
a Health Professions Council proposal27 (Health Professions Council, 18 September 2012) 
to consider piloting the “licensing” of social care workers and healthcare support 
workers. The White Paper says that the pilot of a licensing scheme for social care 
workers will also include licensing for healthcare support workers but  it is unclear what 
this means and it will certainly be the lightest of “light touch” regulation.   
 
The DH resistance to any robust regulation of healthcare assistants is unevidenced. It 
complements their opposition to the setting of mandatory skill ratios (or higher staffing 
levels) – see section 8 below. 
 
Risk rating Red 
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2. The recruitment, standards and training of registered 
nurses. 
RCN general secretary Peter Carter expressed concern about the selection and training 
of student nurses and the absence of good-quality mentoring within clinical 
placements.28 (Public Inquiry. 2 November 2011). 
Chief Nursing Officer for England, Dame Christine Beasley, claimed nursing “lost its way” 
because there was not enough focus on the “values” of new nursing entrants.29 (Public 
Inquiry. 2 November 2011). 
Hilary Jones dean of Staffordshire University’s Faculty of Health gave a different 
emphasis. She told the inquiry that nursing departments had had resources cut whilst 
qualified nurses were unable to attend training days due to staff shortages in clinical 
areas. She suggested that the NMC Code and nursing ethics were sacrificed by some 
nurse managers.  
The inquiry heard that some hospital placements were barely fit for purpose, the 
requirements for the accreditation of wards were unclear, the ratio of trained to 
untrained staff was not set out and competencies of supervisors were rarely assessed. 
Even when 140 staff were sacked so that Mid Staffordshire could attain Foundation Trust 
status, students were still allocated to areas with appalling care. Mr Robert Francis QC 
later echoed that claim in stating  
‘The failure of students to complain suggests that they were being socialised to 
accept a culture of indifference where poor standards were the norm”30 (Public 
Inquiry. (2 November 2011). 
Helene Donnelly, one of the few nurses who did repeatedly raise concerns, told the 
inquiry that she had worked as a staff nurse in accident and emergency at Mid Staffs 
hospital between 2004 and 2008. The atmosphere was one of fear with a chronic 
shortage of staff and basic equipment. Two senior ward sisters bullied staff using 
physical threats and verbal abuse. She described how she witnessed “unimaginable” 
suffering with patients left “sobbing and humiliated” by staff. Ms Donnelly refused to 
falsify records and waiting times, and as a result she was threatened and her workload 
increased considerably.31 (Public Inquiry. (2 November 2011). 
Robert Francis’ First Report32 (Robert Francis QC, 2010) made several recommendations 
regarding nurses including: 
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• The board must prioritise ensuring that any member of staff raising a concern is 
supported and protected 
• Clinical audit must be improved, with staff required to take part in audit 
processes 
• Staff involvement in the complaints process must be from investigation to 
outcomes 
• The board must review the management and leadership of nursing  
• The management structure must be reviewed to ensure that the views of clinical 
staff are fully represented at every level of the trust 
• All nursing staff should have training in the diagnosis and management of acute 
confusion  
The DH evidence to the Inquiry focussed on the absence of the appropriate “values” 
demonstrated by nurses. That theme may well have some resonance but it avoids more 
fundamental issues of leadership, management culture, staffing levels, skill mix and the 
failure of the nursing regulator to make clear to both nurses and their nurse managers 
that they must uphold their duty of care and Code of Conduct whatever the pressures to 
not raise concerns. The inquiry is likely to make robust recommendations on the role of 
the NMC in this respect.  
However the Damascene conversion of NHS leaders to distributed leadership and an 
open management culture33 (Kings Fund, 2012) has yet to change what happens in 
many Trusts as suggested a 2011 survey of nurses reported that “that the overwhelming 
majority (84%) said they would be concerned about victimisation, personal reprisals or a negative 
effect on their career if they were to report concerns to their employers.”34 (RCN, 5 December 
2011).   
The current funding pressures on higher education are likely to mean that resources to 
monitor and support nurses and ensure they have appropriate placements may continue 
to be limited. 
Risk Rating Amber 
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3. The training and qualification of those charged with caring 
for the elderly. 
 
 
In evidence to the Inquiry, NHS Medical Director Sir Liam Donaldson said he had been 
“shocked” that the poor care of the elderly had happened when the National Service 
Framework for older people was such a prominent policy. His view was that  
I think there are two things going on. One was that regulatory systems have not 
been able to detect those aspects of care because it’s a softer and less easily 
measurable aspect of care than other technical ways, but it could also be to do 
with society’s view of older people and the extent to which that’s reflected in one 
of our national institutions.35 (Public Inquiry, 19th September 2011). 
Numerous recent reports have highlighted shortcomings in the care of the elderly. The  
Care Quality Commission report36 (CQC, October 2011). inspected 100 NHS hospitals 
focussing on dignity and nutrition, and revealing serious failings in hospital care of 
elderly patients. Les than half of the 100 hospitals inspected (forty five) were fully 
compliant in both dignity and nutrition whilst 35 complied in one or the other area. 
Twenty per cent did not comply in either areas. The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission report' Close to home: older people and human rights in home care' 37 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011) painted an equally depressing picture of 
the extent to which public authorities promote and protect the human rights of older 
people (aged 65 and over) with regards to home based care and support. It mirrored the 
warning from the Commission on Dignity in Care for Older People that commissioners 
must have robust systems to ensure dignified care is being provided, including feedback 
from patients, families and independent advocates.38 (NHS Confederation, 2012)  
Anna Dixon and colleagues (Dixon, A, Foot, C, Harrison. 2012) suggest that “serious 
issues have been well documented in the care of people with dementia across care 
settings, but the regulatory response to this has arguably not been adequate.”39   
The Commission on Dignity in Care for Older People40 (2012) identified the top-down 
culture as a prime cause of poor care, concluding:  
 
‘If senior managers impose a command and control culture that demoralises staff 
and robs them of the authority to make decisions, poor care will follow’.  
 
The King’s Fund summit on the care of frail older people similarly concluded that:  
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team leaders in hospital wards and the community should have a higher status in 
their organisations, with enhanced opportunities for personal development and 
remuneration that reflects the value, complexity and importance of the role. This 
enhanced role should extend to playing a major part in recruiting their own team, 
controlling resources such as equipment and setting the quality of food. All care 
staff, especially team leaders, should see it as their responsibility to speak up if 
rules and working practices are undermining care.41 (Cornwall, J. 2012). 
This move away from nurses administering budgets to controlling them would be a step 
forward but it avoids the crucial issues of the wider management culture, resources 
(notably staffing levels) and a skill mix which relies on up to half of front line ward staff 
being unregistered, poorly paid, health care assistants. Moreover the treatment of staff 
necessarily bears on the quality of care provided and the success of partnership working 
between patients and staff.  The focus of government policy is best indicated by 
Ministers using the adult care White Paper to emphasise carrot rather than stick when 
deciding, for example, to rely on “spreading good practice rather than banning ….. the 
practice of councils contracting for home care "by the minute" or in short-time slots” .bid 
to end home care contracting by the minute.42 (Mithran Samuel. 12 July 2012). 
 
Risk rating: Red 
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4. The recruitment, training, support and regulation of senior 
managers of NHS organisations. 
 
 
Counsel to the Inquiry’s closing written submission stated: 
205. Further consideration should be given to the way in which the GMC deals 
with doctors who are in senior management positions and whose fitness to 
practice is called into question by reason of their having presided over significant 
or systemic failings in patient care. 
He pointed out that: 
209. Notwithstanding the duty to raise concerns about patients safety outlined in 
Good Medical Practice no doctors at the Trust approached the GMC or any other 
body with their concerns about the standards of patient care generally or to 
report that a colleague may present a risk of harm to patients. 
In his closing verbal submission, Tom Kark QC, counsel to the Inquiry stressed: 
Para 236. The NMC should continue to emphasise that its fitness to practice 
procedures apply equally to those fulfilling a management function as to those 
providing frontline care. The NMC should be proactive in pursuing referrals where 
it is indicated that a registrant fulfilling a management function has presided over 
a significant failure in quality of care. 
Sir David Nicholson told the inquiry that the current situation was “not sustainable” and 
suggested it was an “anomaly” that whilst the board nurse, doctor and accountant could 
all be struck off by their respective professional bodies, the chief executive could not. 
Tom Kark’s closing submission concluded that: 
312. There is also a strong case for the regulation of senior healthcare 
managers….Public confidence in the NHS requires that managers should not be 
rewarded for failure and that those whose continued work in the NHS poses an 
unacceptable risk to patient should be prevented from doing so. 
The DH consultation on Standards for members of NHS boards and governing bodies in 
England.43 (CHRE, 2012) should be seen as an early response to the Inquiry. 
The draft says such senior leaders must demonstrate business skills, such as “being 
open about the evidence, reasoning and reasons behind decisions about budget and 
resource allocation, and contract allocation in particular” and “taking appropriate action 
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to raise concerns if I perceive that my organisation or my colleagues are engaging in any 
harmful behaviour or misconduct”. 
The result of the consultation is not known over five months after it closed. Nor is it clear 
whether the standards will be become a code of conduct, written into contracts of 
employment or a more modern version of the NHS Managers Code of Conduct which the 
Inquiry was told had apparently not resulted in a single example of a manager being 
investigated for breaching the Code since its introduction in 200244 (Sarah Calkin, 27 
October, 2011). Whether these new principles will be given teeth by the DH is, in any 
case, open to question. The omens are not good. David Flory, who as Deputy Chief 
Executive of the NHS sought to block the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry ever being 
established and who tried to find Martin Yeates, disgraced Mid Staffordshire Chief 
Executive, another job in the NHS, is to lead the NHS Trust Development Authority.45  
(Public Inquiry, 15 September 2012). The Authority’s nursing director is to be Peter 
Blythin, director of nursing at NHS West Midlands from 2006, who was criticised for  
having “apparently failed to inject any urgency” into a critical review of nursing levels at 
Mid Staffs.46 (Ben Clover, 25 July 2012)  
Without teeth, it is unclear what the point of a new Code will be. 
 
Risk rating: Amber 
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5. The exercise of the fitness to practise functions of 
professional regulatory bodies. 
 
 
In his closing submission Tom Kark QC was scathing about the failure of those charged 
with regulating professionals: 
204. The GMC’s fitness to practice procedures remain focused on the practice of 
individual doctors. The chairman may wish to consider whether it would be 
desirable for the GMC to adopt a more proactive approach where through fitness 
to practice hearings more systematic failings are identified within organisations. 
209. Notwithstanding the duty to raise concerns about patients safety outlined in 
Good Medical Practice no doctors at the Trust approached the GMC or any other 
body with their concerns about the standards of patient care generally or to 
report that a colleague may present a risk of harm to patients. 
215. The university’s (Keele Medical School) internal quality assurance processes 
did not identify any of the quality of care issues at the Trust identify in the 
Healthcare Commission report or the Independent Inquiry report.   
218. Further, the Chairman may wish to consider whether the communication 
between the University and GMC is indicative of the GMC being offered a platitude 
rather than being engaged collaboratively. 
233. In spite of the fact that the NMC Code of Conduct places a duty on all nurses 
to raise concerns about patient safety there were a very limited number of 
examples of such concerns having been raised at or about the trust 
234. In the past the NMC has exercised its Fitness to Practice function only where 
a referral has been made 
236 The NMC should continue to emphasise that its fitness to practice procedures 
apply equally to those fulfilling a management function as to those providing front 
line care. The NMC should be proactive in pursuing referrals where it is indicated 
that a registrant fulfilling a management function has presided over a significant 
failure in quality of care. 
The DH response to concerns about regulators has been to encourage the CHRE to step 
in when regulators appear to be in crisis whether it be the GSCC47 (CHRE, September 
2009) or the NMC48 (CHRE, 2012) but in each case the focus appears to have primarily 
been on improving administrative procedures and management rather than ensuring 
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professional regulators are proactive in holding to account practitioners and their 
managers, and in giving robust support to those who, in complying with their Code of 
Conduct raise concerns about standards of care and conduct within their employer. 
Though regulators have been more proactive recently in encouraging registrants to raise 
concerns49 (NMC. 2012) it remains to be seen whether such activity is sustained and 
encouraged by the DH. 
 
 
Risk rating: Amber/Red 
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6. The engagement of healthcare generally in the leadership 
and management of their organisations. 
 
 
Tom Kark’s closing submissions on the leadership and management of Mid Staffordshire 
Trust were damning: 
88. The Trust failed to place patient safety and quality of care at the heart of 
everything it did. It lost sight of its key purpose. 
89. The trust did not embrace complaints, adverse incident reporting or 
whistleblowing as valuable sources of learning and improvement 
90. The Board relied upon the assessments of outside organisations and 
measures to be satisfied about the standards of care it provided, rather than 
using effective internal measures and scrutinising information such as complaints 
and adverse incidents that was available to it to hear what those delivering and 
experiencing care at the trust were saying. 
102. Effective clinical governance…… should seek to gain valuable data on 
performance through a variety of key sources including selected quality 
measures, clinical audit, complaints adverse incidents patient and staff feedback 
and whistleblowers. Lessons learnt must be implemented and staff held to 
account where they are not. There is merit in the idea of greater guidance and 
standardisation of clinical governance procedures in the NHS 
The Mid Staffordshire Hospital NHS Foundation Trust management culture was almost a 
parody of that which research evidence suggests delivers best performance for patients. 
Research demonstrates that in organisations that value their staff: 
 
• patient experience improves, inspection scores are higher and infection and 
mortality rates are lower50 (West M, Dawson J 2012).  
• staff are significantly less likely to make mistakes51 (Prins JT et al, 2010)  
• staff provide safer patient care52 (Laschinger HKS, Leiter MP. 2006)  
• there is lower absenteeism and lower levels of turnover53. (West M, Dawson J 
2011).   
 
Research suggests a strong link between poor treatment of staff and poor Trust 
performance.54 (Dawson J. 2009). The Boorman Review of the NHS staff mental health55 
(Dr Steven Boorman, 2009) found a strong link between stress and poor trust 
performance. Healthcare Commission surveys repeatedly demonstrated that where staff 
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rated the quality of leadership higher the trust performance was higher, as were scores 
for clinical governance whilst there were less patient complaints56 (Healthcare 
Commission. 2009). 
Unfortunately, despite the increasing volume and robustness of such evidence, the 
management culture of the last two decades was instead characterised by highly 
hierarchical and often bullying leadership models which might conceivably have been 
effective for managing a budget, hitting performance targets and rationalising unpopular 
decisions, but are unlikely to develop staff engagement. 
Just eight months ago, a detailed assessment of around 900 participants in the NHS Top 
Leaders programme concluded: 
they are “high on over-confidence” and suffer from “an absence of attention to 
detail and completion of tasks”….They are “not necessarily understanding their 
own limitations” and do not tend to listen to others.57(Charlotte Santry. 12 
January, 2012). 
The work of Beverly Alimo-Metcalfe58 (Alimo-Metcalfe B, Alban-Metcalfe J 2008) and the 
work on leadership from the Kings Fund59 (Kings Fund 2012) is becoming increasingly 
influential but exhortations from Sir David Nicholson for openness and transparency 
within Trusts60 (Charlotte Santry. 23 May 2008)  sit uneasily with evidence to the Inquiry 
about the DH culture prior to his arrival and since. 
Despite two independent reports to the inquiry and several witness statements, Sir 
David Nicholson and other DH officials denied there was a “shame and blame culture” 
within the DH. Sir Hugh Taylor former permanent secretary denied he led a culture of 
fear in the DH referring instead to “robust management style.”  The Darzi Review into 
quality in the NHS61 (Lord Darzi. 2008) commissioned a review which interviewed more 
than 50 stakeholders and concluded that a “pervasive culture of fear” existed throughout 
the NHS and in parts of the DH, with fear among chief executives of public humiliation or 
losing their jobs as a prime driver for quality improvement. Sir Hugh Taylor denied there 
was such a widespread culture though the Inquiry then drew his attention to other 
reports which had reached similar conclusions and he accepted that “at times a level of 
stridency would have entered the way this programme was taken forward.”62 (Public 
Inquiry. 26 September 2011). 
 
Notwithstanding such assurances, the NHS Confederation, representing employers, 
reported in 2009 that 
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“Several of our interviewees identified a problem of a perceived or real toxicity in 
the wider system inhabited by chief executives, describing the environment as 
“brutal”, “arbitrary”, “prone to favouritism” and intolerant of risk-taking that isn’t 
successful. This has been a recurring theme of any discussion about NHS 
leadership for a long time. Whether apparent or real, people at director level and 
below believe that these behaviours are prevalent.  
 
“They may be a significant factor in deterring them from seeking chief executive 
roles and are likely to have an especially off-putting effect on clinicians. This 
culture of blame may also shape the behaviour of those already in leadership 
posts – breeding the passivity and risk aversion we refer to earlier in this paper – 
and was also a strong theme in 2007 when we investigated this issue.”63 (NHS 
Confederation. 2009).  
 
Those concerns were shared by Sir Ian Kennedy:  
A bullying culture in the NHS is “permeating the delivery of care”, Healthcare 
Commission chair Sir Ian Kennedy has told HSJ. 
He said: “One thing that worries me more than anything else in the NHS is 
bullying…..We’re talking about something that is permeating the delivery of care 
in the NHS.” 
The problem was caused by the NHS’s “hierarchical” culture and occurred across 
all staff groups, he said. 
A “strong strand” running through the Bristol Inquiry into children’s heart surgery 
at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, which Sir Ian led, was that its chief nurse had been 
“bullying everybody”, he said.64 (Charlotte Santry 1 April, 2009)  
 
Chris Hart 65 (Chris Hart. 2003) attributes the rapid increase of a culture of fear to the 
rise of Self Governing Trusts and general management which led to employers seek to 
ensure staff were loyal to their employer and were supposed to raise issues internally 
not through the media as had been common in the 1980s. 
DH leaders and various influential think tanks are currently exhorting management to 
create an open transparent culture in which staff feel confident about raising concerns. 
Staff may be entitled to be a little sceptical about this emphasis not least because 
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exactly four years ago in 2008, at the same time as the Darzi Review revealed 
widespread bullying in the NHS, the very same NHS chief executive David Nicholson told 
Trust chief executives they must “create an environment where staff can report safety 
incidents instead of being ‘hung up to dry’” He said the fact that only 40 per cent of staff 
feel able to report incidents “simply isn’t good enough”,  
“One of the things that really worried me about Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells is 
that the staff didn’t feel they could put their hands up and say there was 
something wrong. This is a deeply dangerous place for an organisation to be. We 
need to create an environment where people feel there’s a just system and they 
won’t be hung up to dry when they raise safety issues.”66 (Charlotte Santry. 23 
May, 2008)  
Yet, despite this, only half of Trust Chief executives had read the recently published 
Report into the Maidstone and Tonbridge Wells scandal and there was no mention at all 
of improving health and safety in the NHS Operating Plan for that year bar mention of 
cleanliness and infection control.  
The strategic direction for the NHS likely to be set by the NHS Commissioning Board67 
(DH. 2012) gives little confidence that practical “teeth” and support will be given to 
make the leadership culture changes that are needed. 
The immense funding pressures, radical restructuring and competition pressures are 
likely to act as serious obstacles to a more effective engaged leadership culture. 
 
Risk rating: red 
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7. The nature of standards set for the safety and quality of 
care, and which organisation or organisations should have 
the responsibility for setting and enforcing them. 
 
The Inquiry repeatedly heard evidence of systemic shortcomings in the nature of 
standards and how they were set and enforced by the Strategic Health Authority, 
Monitor, and CQC. Tom Kark’s written closing submission to the Inquiry says of the  
West Midlands SHA that: 
 
133………. (their) monitoring of the Trust was limited to little more than an 
assessment of compliance with financial and activity targets. 
Of Monitor, he concluded that: 
106. Monitor’s assessment of the trust placed little emphasis on quality of care. It 
relied on compliance activity targets and the trust’s self declaration against the 
Core Standards. 
Such weaknesses apply to the CQC: 
There are concerns also about the quality of care that is offered both within 
residential care homes and in people’s own homes. Regulation by the Care 
Quality Commission provides some safeguards against poor quality, but doubts 
remain about the ability of regulators to prevent well-publicised failures in the 
care of older people in residential settings, in part fuelled by concerns about a 
shift towards greater self-assessment by providers and fewer formal 
inspections.68 (Chris Ham et al. 2012).  
In August 2010, when Monitor reported on its response to the care quality scandal at Mid 
Staffordshire Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, the regulator said it would introduce a 
detailed “quality governance” assessment for applicants, to ensure they were identifying 
and managing care quality risks, and taking action on substandard performance. 
But Monitor’s failings at Mid Staffordshire were then repeated at University Hospitals of 
Morecambe Bay which it admitted had “deep-seated problems” at the time granted the 
trust foundation status. 
The CQC’s failures extended to their own governance. Tom Kark QC asked, in the light of 
the Inquiry hearing evidence from three internal whistleblowers from the CQC including 
Board member Kay Sheldon69 (Public Inquiry. 28 November 2011):  
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175. Is the leadership of the CQC sufficiently open to internal criticism from which 
the organisation might learn to improve its systems and behaviour?  
Equally damning, the Inquiry heard from CQC inspector Amanda Pollard that the CQC 
would not necessarily “spot another Mid Staffordshire” and who described an 
unmanageable workload, a culture focused on targets, and “every incentive not to issue 
a warning notice” and give a less labour intensive compliance action instead.70 (Public 
Inquiry. 28 November (2011). Subsequently both the CQC Chair and Chief Executive 
have resigned but whilst this is likely to improve the internal culture, a serious lack of 
resources appears to be leading to a potentially problematic inspection model.71 (CQC. 
2012)  
The Health and Safety Executive’s role was also questioned: 
188. Despite a theoretically  broad ranging power to investigate and prosecute in 
cases of patient harm, the HSE’s policy has had the effect in general of limiting its 
role to investigations of fault equipment and facilities rather than inadequate 
systems of clinical governance or insufficient quality of care 
189. The meant that the HSE was in no position to detect poor care at the trust. 
Neither its reporting processes under RIDDOR nor its investigative decision 
making processes were set up to fulfil its role. 
He asked (Para 179) whether “urgent action (should be) taken to ensure clear lines of 
responsibility are created between the CQC and the HSE. 
However, the fundamental problem for the HSE is that its funding, staffing and expertise 
has been critically weakened in recent years undermining its a proactive role. The 2012 
Budget statement promised to “scrap or improve 84 per cent of health and safety 
regulation” but this appears to be an evidence-free policy.  
The United States government published research72 (Paul Schulte et al, 2012) that put 
the cost of occupational injury and illness in the USA at $250 billion a year. In the UK 
HSE published research concluded:  
“existing evidence suggests that legal regulations and their enforcement 
constitute a key, and perhaps the most important, driver of director actions in 
respect of health and safety at work.”73 (James,P. Wright,F. 2006)  
The academic literature is dominated by studies showing three factors are key to making 
work safer: decent regulations; a meaningful threat of enforcement backed up by 
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punitive penalties; and genuine worker involvement. Yet the numbers of HSE safety 
inspectors and inspections, already cut repeatedly over the last decade, were further 
slashed by a third. Most firms were at a stroke removed from any threat of unannounced 
preventive official safety inspections as “light touch” regulation crept in.74 (Hazards 
Magazine. 2010) 
Yet research suggests a surprise visit from an official safety inspector is good for both 
jobs and the bottom line.75 (Harvard Business School. May 17 2012). Commenting on 
the study in the, Toffel and co-author David I Levine note:  
“Randomly inspected establishments improve worker safety and reduce 
employers' premiums for workers' compensation insurance. And we found no 
evidence that these establishments suffer any of the competitiveness problems 
suggested by political rhetoric - like disruptions leading to lost sales or solvency 
concerns, or any effects on wages - compared to our control group. The 
differences are small but telling: (inspections) offer substantial value to workers, 
companies, and society.”76 (David I. Levine and Michael W. Toffel May 30, 2012).)  
Relatives of those killed at Mid Staffordshire have pressed for a corporate manslaughter 
prosecution.77 (Aislinn Laing. (March 1 2010). 
The impact of any convictions would be both financial (defence of a Corporate 
Manslaughter Act prosecution will not be indemnified by the NHS Litigation Authority as 
it is a criminal matter) and reputational, particularly in respect of the Publicity Order.  
Whilst the Inquiry is likely (arguably regrettably) to remain silent on that specific issue it 
acknowledged the more general concern: 
 
Prosecutions in respect of individual cases of clinical error (save for gross 
negligence) may not benefit the system or patients but prosecutions of healthcare 
organisation in respect of systemic failing have the capacity to encourage better 
care 197. 
The Inquiry heard that the HSE was reluctant to undertake just such a prosecution  after 
it was called in by police investigating the death of 66 year old Gillian Astbury in 2007. 
An inquest into Ms Astbury’s death had ruled she died as a result of “shortcomings” in 
management and staffing levels. The Crown Prosecution Service subsequently they 
would not seek a conviction for manslaughter by gross negligence. Ms Astbury’s partner 
Ron Street told the inquiry he had met the HSE’s principal inspector of factories, to 
discuss a prosecution in relation to her death and said  
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“He… informed me that Gillian’s case represented possibly one of the most 
difficult prosecution decisions that he’d faced in his career, because if a successful 
prosecution was mounted in Gill’s case, the HSE was under-resourced [to] cope 
with the anticipated demands from other families which might ensue.”78 (Public 
Inquiry. (8 December 2010).  
Tom Kark QC noted that 
185. There is currently no duty on providers to report near misses to the CQC. 
The inquiry may wish to give consideration s to whether such a duty should be 
created. 
and suggested 
261. It might be thought advisable to make the NPSA’s guidance on incident 
reporting procedure mandatory for trusts….There would seem to be no reason 
why it should not be mandatory. 
More generally, the Inquiry Counsel questioned a more fundamental part of the current 
regulatory framework, self certification: 
171. Any system which employs self certification as part of its model must ensure 
that the questions are directed to identifying the quality of outcomes for patients 
and not the quality of processes except insofar as those processes are 
demonstrated to be effective in promoting positive outcomes. 
The Inquiry noted how internal reporting systems failed at Mid Staffordshire, thus 
obstructing learning from patient safety79 (Public Inquiry. 8 December 2010) whilst 
Professor Brian Jarman’s evidence went further to suggest that deliberate fabrication of 
data took place by senior staff, some of whom are presumably still in post80 (Professor 
Sir Brian Jarman. 26 May 2011). 
Those conclusions parallel those of the Winterbourne View Serious Case Review (SCR) 
which concluded that institutions such as Winterbourne View were "ill-suited" to the 
"light-touch" regulatory model employed by the CQC, which was "over-reliant on self-
assessment". The SCR said "closed establishments" such as Winterbourne should have a 
more prescriptive approach, specifying best practice for inputs and processes, such as 
staffing and models of care, as well as for outcomes.81 (Margaret Flynn. 2012)  
The Inquiry’s conclusion that Mid Staffordshire problems were not unique were 
corroborated by an anonymous posting in Health Service Journal after the Inquiry closed  
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As a management consultancy we offered an independent, expert review of 
quality at a Hospital with concerns on mortality rates. 
We found unreported iatrogenic deaths from a small sample of deceased patients 
notes, high levels of mortality amongst low incidence surgical procedures, lack of 
transparency in the reporting of mortality figures meaning that unjustified 
improvements were being presented as true; lack of follow up to issues involved 
in clinical audit; lack of follow through on accident and incident reports; lack of 
full implementation of safety notices; concerns on the hydration and feeding of 
patients etc, etc. Needless to say we were not invited back. Or have been able to 
interest other hospitals. Unfortunately many Chief executives and Medical 
directors see their job as keeping their hospital out of the newspapers. Their best 
tactic seems to be cover up, wilful blindness and solicitors.82 (Anonymous 
comment on Ben Clover. 25th July 2012).  
That experience suggests that the reluctance to acknowledge and engage with real 
problems is still widespread. That “denial” was perhaps encouraged by the fact that in 
2008 at the height of the Mid Staffs scandal there was nothing on health and safety in 
the NHS operating plan beyond infection control and cleanliness.83 (DH. 2007). Similar 
concerns about “quality accounts” were raised by NHS Medical Director Sir Bruce Keogh 
who agreed they would be “self certified spin” if a board wasn’t performing effectively84 
(Public Inquiry. 21 September 2012). 
Another theme which concerned the Inquiry was the confusion regarding the roles, 
responsibilities and methodologies of the various regulatory organisations and 
professional bodies responsible for quality notably the lack of communication, between 
the CQC’s predecessor (the Healthcare Commission) the HSE and Monitor. 
The political pressures on the CQC were highlighted in evidence by its then Chair 
Baroness Young who told the Inquiry that she was often subjected to political pressure  
to keep bad news out of the media and when CQC reports were found to be 
unfavourable, she was “leant on” to alter or “tone down” her reports so that they were 
less critical of the NHS. “Political interference was rife,” she said.85 (Public Inquiry. 21 
September 2012). 
Yet another concern is how quality governance will be assured outside of foundation 
trusts – in primary care, private companies and the voluntary sector. The National 
Quality Board guidance on quality for Boards86 (National Quality Board (2011) does not 
make this clear. Contrary to the government “localism” and deregulation agenda, on 
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these, as on other matters the Inquiry is clearly considering a range of recommendations 
around the standardisation and mandating of reporting systems: 
181. Should the production of guidelines for a model of clinical governance (be) 
made a priority for the CQC? 
184. A single body is given the responsibility of ensuring all Trusts comply with 
Patient Safety Alerts and their successors. 
The Care Quality Commission is currently consulting on its strategy for 2013-1687 (CQC. 
(2012) which suggests it moves away from regular inspections of all regulated 
organisations and revert towards a more risk-based model, a complete change from 
which it decided to do a year ago under public pressure. The new strategy appears to be 
driven as much by its limited resources as any evidence such an approach is more.  
 
Risk rating: Red  
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8. The relevance of staffing levels and skill mix to those 
standards. 
 
 
Particularly controversial in any recommendations will be the issues of staffing levels and 
skill mix (and the linked matter of healthcare assistant regulation). 
Tom Kark QC is clear: 
182. Consideration should be given to the production of model staffing guidelines 
for certain types of wards and departments against which the CQC should assess 
the acceptability of staffing in the providers for which they have regulatory 
responsibility. 
That view was influenced by repeated evidence about staffing shortages: 
225. The evidence from the College (of Emergency Medicine) indicated that 
nationally numbers of consultants in Accident and emergency medicine are 
woefully inadequate…..This is a matter of grave concern.  
257. A lesson from Mid Staffordshire and elsewhere is that staffing levels are a 
clear risk factor in acute trusts. Accepting that it would be beyond the remit of a 
CNST (Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts) assessor to scrutinise actual 
staffing levels it might be thought advisable for the assessment to at least 
examine how a trust manages the risks arising in this area. A standard or 
criterion that that required a trust to demonstrate, for example, that it took 
regular account of the staffing indicators listed in the Royal College of Nursing’s 
policy document RCN policy position: evidence based nurse staffing levels or a 
similar set of agreed indicators might be desirable. 
297 The DH should consider providing or endorsing guidance on minimum nurse 
staffing levels…..the Inquiry may well conclude that without some form of 
centrally approved guidance on staffing levels, an unacceptable risk is created 
that the pleas of nursing directors may be overborne by management seeking to 
make cost savings or o9therwise interfere with fundamental levels of care. 
Dame Christine Beasley from DH rejected calls for statutory guidance on staff numbers 
and skill mix. Instead she suggested the CQC as part of its licensing process could look 
at what processes organisations had in place for determining and monitoring staffing 
levels. She agreed that a 60:40 registered to unregistered was as low as you should go 
in an acute hospital ward but claimed minimum staffing levels would become a ceiling 
not a floor.88 (Sarah Calkin. 8 September, 2011).   
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In what looked like an attempt to pre-empt any recommendation on minimum staffing 
levels the chief executive of the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence claimed: 
“minimum staffing levels are an example of inflexible regulation which distracts 
staff from time which they should be devoting to patient care. Lack of staff is 
often an excuse for poor care. But is care better where there are more staff and 
worse where there are fewer? Will minimum staffing levels secure quality? I 
doubt it. There is no direct correlation between number of staff and good or bad 
care, so mandated staffing levels cannot be necessary. But would mandated 
staffing levels raise the standard of those that are failing? Research suggests 
not.89 (Harry Cayton. 15 March 2012).  
This is simply not true, as was swiftly pointed out: 
Harry Cayton …. asserts: “There is no direct correlation between number of staff 
and good or bad care.” But more than a decade of published research challenges 
this perspective. 
A previous UK study found that proportionally fewer patients die in hospitals with 
better nurse to patient ratios (Rafferty et al, International Journal of Nursing 
Studies 2007). And more recently, research from across Europe published last 
week in the BMJ demonstrates two key points: staffing varies hugely, even on 
wards of the same specialty; and differences in patient to nurse ratios are 
associated with differences in both patient and nurse outcomes (Aiken et al 
2012).90 (Anne Marie Rafferty and Jane Ball. 29 March 2012)  
As I responded at the time,  
minimum staffing ratios are being seriously considered by the Mid Staffordshire 
Foundation Trust inquiry precisely because the current regulatory regime and 
management culture between them failed dismally to ensure both minimum 
staffing levels and appropriate staffing ratios between skilled and less skilled 
staff. ……It is correct that higher staffing levels do not ensure better quality of 
care if the management and staff culture is wrong. It is equally true however that 
lower staffing levels make it less likely that quality care will be provided.91 (Roger 
Kline.29 March 2012). 
In his evidence to the Inquiry, Professor Jarman appeared to take a similar view: 
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274. Dr Jarman comments (that) lower HSMRs (Hospital Standardised Mortality 
Rates) are significantly associated with more doctors per bed and fewer managers 
per bed (although the latter variable is only just significant)…..this may be 
thought to lend weight to the inference of a correlation between high HSMRs and 
poor staff and patient surveys which relate to poor staff presence and poor 
communication with patients, In other words, poor staff ratios are directly linked 
to links.  
A similar debate amongst social workers was prompted by an Audit Commission report92 
(Audit Commission. August 2012) which drew robust criticism93 (Mithran Samuel. August 
23, 2012). 
Mid Staffordshire was not alone in having inadequate staffing numbers. A survey just 
three months ago concluded the research found:  
the average proportion of registered nursing staff – compared to unregistered 
healthcare assistants – on day shifts was 56%. Dame Christine Beasley, the 
previous chief nursing officer for England, has previously said the ratio of nurses 
to assistants should not fall below 60:40. 
The research found the proportion of registered nurses to assistants varied from 
43% to 68% between trusts. 
Nurses were also asked about patient safety on their ward. Where they said it 
was “excellent”, there was an average of seven patients per registered nurse, 
compared to more than nine where patient safety was “poor” or “failing.94 (Jo 
Stephenson. 24 July 2012)  
Tom Kark’s view was unequivocal: 
25. Healthcare assistants should be regulated  
An indication of the likely robust response to any calls by the Inquiry for mandated 
staffing levels of skill mix rations is given by the DH response to the Commons’ Health 
Select Committee proposals on staffing levels and skill mix  The DH maintained its 
position that local providers were “best placed” to decide these issues. “Health service 
managers, clinicians and employers…must be free to manage their own workforce and 
clinical teams to meet the health service needs of their community,” it said”95(DH. 
September 2012).  
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Immense funding pressures are likely to continue to exert downward pressures on both 
staffing levels and skill mix. 
Risk rating: red. 
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9. The interface between the regulation of governance, 
finance, and quality and safety standards. 
The Inquiry QC’s closing submission was clear: 
106. Monitor’s assessment of the trust placed little emphasis on quality of care. It 
relied on compliance activity targets and the trust’s self declaration against the 
Core Standards. 
17. West Midlands SHA ………. monitoring of the Trust was limited to little more 
than an assessment of compliance with financial and activity targets. 
161. In the light of the failures of communication between the quality regulator 
and the financial regulator and the limited role envisaged for Monitor in the 
future, the Chairman may wish to consider whether it would be appropriate to 
make any recommendations as to whether or not there should continue to be a 
separation between the economic and quality regulators….  
310. The Inquiry should consider whether a single regulator should have 
responsibility for quality and finance in the NHS. It is a lesson of the Inquiry that 
the two are inextricably linked and that focussing on one aspect at the expense of 
the other can have catastrophic results. A trust’s clinical plan and its business 
plan should have the same priorities.  
Sir Liam Donaldson said he ”wasn’t sure that in their heart of hearts everybody [in the 
NHS] was convinced that we could run a service which met the financial and productivity 
targets but also delivered quality”.96 (Public Inquiry. (19th September 2011). 
The Draft Mandate to the NHS Commissioning Board97 (DH (2012) confidently asserts as 
“Objective 22” that it will: 
“ensure the delivery of efficiency savings in a sustainable manner to maintain or 
improve quality in the current Spending Review period and beyond.” 
This might reasonably appear to be a victory of aspiration over reality as was perhaps 
recognised by the newly appointed CQC chief executive’s admission that he was 
concerned quality would suffer amid public spending constraints. He warned the health 
and social care system not to be “naïve” about it. 
“As the financial challenges continue I think there is a real risk that quality could 
begin to be impacted,” he said. “We have got a role, not just on quality for 
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individuals and at individual service level but we need to comment on quality at 
the national level.”98 (Sarah Calkin. 7 September, 2012).  
Further complexity in the balance between finance and quality arises from Ministers’ 
determination that competition must increase. Monitor can reasonably expect to struggle 
to match its new responsibilities for competition law enforcement with the need for 
integrated patient care, which requires close co-operation between providers along the 
pathway.99 (Bruce Kilpatrick. 23 August 2012).  
Healthcare providers and healthcare professionals, faced with reduced resources and 
rising demand must always ensure that the care that they do provide is safe. To do so 
may require that, in the absence of improved working methods, what they provide is 
reduced. There will be immense political pressures to avoid doing so, but organisations 
that fail to understand the interface between their own duty of care, that of their staff 
and the available resources are at serious risk. 
Risk rating: Red 
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10. The use of commissioning to require and monitor safety 
and quality standards or provision. 
 
GPs work largely as small businesses. They will play a dominant role in the NHS 
following the Health and Social Care Act. Little consideration, beyond assertion, of 
whether their greatly increased role will improve the accountability of the NHS to 
patients, or improve quality or lessen harm, appears to have played any part in 
discussions around their new role. The Inquiry will not comment directly on the 
implications of the new legislation, but its conclusions (and those of others) are clear. 
The closing submission from Tom Kark reminds us that: 
124.The use of contracts and financial incentives to promote quality 
improvements and to ensure a flow of performance data, patient feedback and 
safety information to commissioners is vital  
127.Commissioners must have the skill, ability and resources to monitor and 
evaluate the information they receive….GPs will require very significant 
administrative support to enable them to take on this task  
However, he shares the wider concerns that: 
30. The evidence from the GPs did not in general provide grounds for optimism or 
for making positive recommendations  
34. The patient experience ought to become embedded in the commissioning 
process which has clearly not happened to date  
The Act will increase competition within the NHS with likely adverse implications for the 
collaboration and integration essential for good health care and to reduce the risk of 
harm. UK and EU competition law will apply so: 
• Monitor will have a duty to eliminate “anti-competitive” behaviour 
• Clinical Commissioning Groups will have major  procurement responsibilities 
without obviously having the capacity or governance to deliver these CCGs may 
(and many will) outsource commissioning work to private companies 
• The courts are likely to regard NHS services as falling within the scope of UK and 
EU competition law. 
Far from increasing transparency (and thus accountability) the new commissioning and 
provider environment is likely to make any presumption of openness unless there is a 
need for confidentiality extremely unlikely as providers and commissioners behave likely 
commercial organisations. 
38 
 
Private health providers who have more expertise and legal capacity than public bodies 
are likely to turn to time-consuming and costly litigation against commissioners who may 
well not have the procurement expertise to control a complex procurement process and 
avoid legal action from private healthcare providers. It is not surprising that Tom Kark 
concludes: 
117. The commercial nature of the relationship between the trust and its 
commissioner, and the inevitable imbalance of clinical expertise may well mean 
that expecting full disclosure of problems …. is unrealistic  
The former acting director general of commissioning at DH told the inquiry  
“A number of the changes we made to commissioning over the last ten years have taken 
longer than they should have done which has unsettled people in the system and taken 
people’s eyes of the ball from their day to day job… There are times when we should 
have spent longer… working through some of the implications of some changes.  
Politically commissioning is a longer term solution and the things in health care are often 
immediate priorities and so maybe commissioning was pushed back because of that.”100 
(Public Inquiry. 21st September 2012).  
The serious case review into the Winterbourne View scandal agreed that Castlebeck's 
published policies, procedures, operational practices and clinical governance were good. 
However there was a huge gap between those paper policies and how patients were 
actually assessed and cared for. Commissioners had clearly been misled (successfully) 
and it is far from clear that lessons about monitoring services and feedback have been 
learnt elsewhere to prevent a recurrence, especially with self assessed quality so 
prevalent.101 (Margaret Flynn. (2012). 
Concern about the capacity of commissioners is widespread: 
 
Quality assurance must not stop at the identification of problems or risks – it 
must ensure that they are dealt with swiftly and effectively. There is evidence 
that investigation and inquiry reports are insufficiently acted on or followed up. In 
the immediate future, clinical commissioning groups will find it hard, particularly 
in view of their limited resources, to carry out these tasks. So, there is a risk that 
this gap in the current system will be perpetuated.102 (Dixon, A. Foot, C Harrison, 
T. (2011).  
 
 Risk rating: red/amber 
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11. The potential adverse consequence of structural 
reorganisations and the requirements for addressing these. 
 
The Inquiry was provided with evidence confirming “the importance of a systematic 
handover at times of organisational upheaval”103 (Public Inquiry. December 1st 2011) 
and its closing submission heard that: 
318. The DH should consider wherever possible how it can promote organisational 
stability within the healthcare system…all those is setting the direction of the NHS 
must give proper consideration to the detrimental effects of reorganisation on the 
capacity of those working in the NHS to do their jobs well. 
Those fears are underlined by the fearful complexity of the new NHS arrangements. 
There are:  
• five organisations to safeguard patients' interests,  
• nine organisations to support care providers and 
• three organisations whose role will be 'empowering patients and local 
communities'. 
• Public Health England and local authorities whose role will be to promote public 
health  
• some two hundred clinical commissioning groups  
• more than a dozen bodies with a direct role in quality. 
These bodies, whose roles will inevitably overlap, will work alongside: 
• Around 200 acute and mental health trusts,  
• Some 8,300 general practices   
• Up to 18,000 care homes 
• A growing number of private companies and voluntary sector providers. 
Evidence from former Department of Health permanent secretary Sir Hugh Taylor stated 
that reorganisation of the NHS in 2006 was a major factor in problems at Mid 
Staffordshire Foundation Trust and that with any restructure that there would be a loss 
of corporate memory.104 (Public Inquiry. 26th September). 
One aspect of the current radical restructuring has been “a tripling of turnover among 
the NHS managers, nurses and doctors responsible for monitoring hospital care 
quality”.105 (Dave West. 9 May, 2012) and those losses complement the existing high 
rate of turnover of NHS chief executives whose average time in post is allegedly just 700 
days’106 (The King's Fund Commission on NHS Leadership and Management. 2011). Anna 
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Dixon and colleagues (Dixon, A. Foot, C Harrison, and T. 2011) highlight some of the 
direct consequences for quality of care. 
A review of early warning systems was commissioned108 (National Quality Board 
(February 2010) in response to an earlier review by the Healthcare Commission into Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust109 (Healthcare Commission (March 2009). That 
report provided a comprehensive overview of the structures and processes in place at 
the time to assure quality and to ensure early signs of quality failures were identified and 
addressed. It made a series of recommendations for further steps that could be taken to 
enhance the mechanisms for safeguarding the quality of care. However, as a result of 
the Health and Social Care Act 2012, many of the organisations who played a key role in 
that system of assurance are being abolished and new organisations with different 
responsibilities are being created. 
Importantly, learning and dynamic systems can best develop when there is a basic level 
of organisational stability, so that organisations and the staff within them can build 
experience and expertise. Regulation in the health sector has been much more prone to 
reorganisations than other sectors. The loss of some organisations (such as the National 
Patient Safety Agency) and the frequent reorganisation of system regulators such as the 
Care Quality Commission and its predecessors have weakened the system’s ability to 
learn and improve.  
Chris Ham, Anna Dixon, and Beatrice Brooke110 (2012) argue that: 
Constant restructuring of the health and social care system focused on 
organisational changes not only misses the point that improvements in services 
are what matters, but also make it difficult for those working in the system to 
deliver high-quality care in line with their training and values. 
There must be a real risk that the impact of the current immense restructuring causes 
disruption, organisational memory loss and a diversion of attention on at least the scale 
of previous restructures. 
Risk rating: Red 
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12. The role of foundation trust governors and members, 
and other local public, patient and staff representatives (and 
complaints processes and embedding the patient voice). 
 
Foundation Trust governors 
There is no shortage of detailed regulation and advice regarding Foundation Trust 
governors111 (Monitor. 2009). One authority111 (Alimo-Metcalfe B. 2012) suggests Trust 
boards should pay particularly close attention to the results of the NHS staff survey, 
especially those relating to whether staff would recommend their organisation as a place 
to work and be treated. 
 
However the extent to which such Governors are themselves really accountable to their 
nominal constituency is debateable. Their over-riding obligation is to the interests of the 
Trust. Substantial numbers of Trusts even needed persuading that their Boards should 
meet in public. Trust Network chief executive Sue Slipman, when questioned whether 
board meetings should be in public, pointed out that 
Currently around half of the 137 authorised foundation trusts have their board 
meetings in public. The Foundation Trust Network was not in favour of forcing all 
FTs to have open board meetings because simply having open meetings does not 
solve complex issues of governance and accountability. 
A private company’s shareholders would not expect to be invited into the 
boardroom to witness debate and strategy setting.  
In future, all providers of NHS services will be independent organisations. If the 
argument is that all organisations in receipt of public money should have open 
board meetings, the rules should apply equally. If open meetings apply only to 
FTs, government needs to explain why they are different from other independent 
providers of NHS services.113 (Sue Slipman. 4 August, 2011).  
Apparently those who lead many such Trusts have yet to be convinced that openness 
and transparency in all matters is necessary. Yet without such openness in all matters, 
not least the publication of relevant data to make informed comment and decision 
making, and a genuine commitment to meaningful consultation, the tendency towards 
denial and a closing of ranks will continue. Following the First Inquiry Report, the DH 
published comprehensive advice to Boards114 (Angus Ramsay and Naomi Fulop. February 
2011) but recent CQC reports suggest that this is far from being universally followed. 
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The guidance stressed the importance of internal monitoring and governance rather than 
reliance on external inspection.  
 
In doing so it referred approvingly to Healthcare Commission research115 (Healthcare 
Commission. 2008) and asserted that: 
 
Research suggests better Board oversight of quality information is associated with 
superior performance on such indicators as mortality, morbidity and 
complications  
 
Research in the healthcare domain suggests that, in such a culture, staff are 
more likely to engage with incident reporting systems, with better reporting and 
learning from errors.  
 
Other local public, patient and staff representatives 
The role of the statutory complaints procedures and patients advocates was heavily 
criticised by the Inquiry. The evidence of Malcolm Alexander, as chair of the National 
Association of LINKs members, however, was compelling in three respects. He expressed 
deep concern about likely future funding of HealthWatch and about the independence of 
HealthWatch within its new CQC “home” and made the case for the reintegration of 
complaints advocacy services, patient and public involvement and local scrutiny of 
service variation, a view regarded as having some force by the Inquiry Counsel.116 
(Malcolm Alexander. 30 March 2011). 
Other organisations with a consultative or scrutiny role came off no better. 
48. There is good evidence that the (Borough Overview and Scrutiny Committee) 
(OSC) had lost sight of its duty to scrutinise the Trust’s services as well as take 
an overview of them  
51. Patient relatives felt that the committee’s bureaucratic approach hampered 
public participation. It might be argued that there should be a clear presumption 
in favour of structured public participation in the proceedings of such bodies.  
As public health functions transfer to local authority it will become even more important 
that such processes are well known, well understood, and have a presumption of 
disclosure and involvement.  
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The OSC must currently be consulted where there is substantial variation or 
development of services and in some cases there is a duty to consult before the decision 
is made. It is worth noting that because the Government is removing the Secretary of 
State’s duty to ensure the NHS delivers an appropriate service, appeals from locally 
elected council bodies and health watchdogs will no longer be decided by the Secretary 
of State 
MPs fared little better: 
74. MPs do not appear to have played an effective role in the protections of the 
local population  
 
Complaints processes 
 
The closing submission from the Inquiry Counsel reflected evidence about the 
shortcomings of the complaints procedures and systems for patient advocacy. Central to 
the Inquiry recommendation are likely to be an insistence that services must be patient 
centred with patients concerns and views being a crucial element in identifying poor 
quality care and improving it. Tom Kark QC states: 
14. Patients and the public must be informed of how to raise concerns outside 
their hospitals own structure….There must be more stability and continuity of 
organisational structures  
“Strengthening the patient voice” has been de rigour for DH policies in the last few years 
yet a combination of defensiveness and secrecy on the one hand, and instability in 
patient advocacy arrangements on the other, have meant the benefits of effective 
patient input have not been realised 
315. The NHS has failed consistently to harness the power of the patient and 
public voice in monitoring the quality of services PPIFs and LINKs were 
unsuccessful. In future members of the public should be embedded within 
hospital governance structures in order to ensure that those delivering care are 
held to account. 
19. Meaningful and understandable data on quality and safety must be placed in 
the public arena in order to facilitate open and honest consideration and learning 
when things are going wrong.  
Tom Kark QC said dealing with complaints must be viewed as:  
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9. (a) a fundamental part of the hospital’s function in caring for patients and 
respect for their loved ones, and 
(b) an opportunity to improve performance and prevent future harm.  
However, the complaints process failed at Mid Staffordshire.  
3. The complaints process….failed to value and utilise complaints and to treat 
complainants with the respect they deserved….. When they went to the PALS 
service they found an office that was chaotic, understaffed and unable to cope 
with concerns or escalate serious concerns effectively.  
6. The Trust showed a defensive attitude towards complaints in keeping with its 
general reluctance to admit to poor quality care. 
There already exists under-used national guidance and standards on complaints handling 
(The Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) 
Regulations 2009) and Tom Kark suggests adherence to such standards “could become 
part of the key outcomes operated by the CQC” 24. 
Ironically, just one month before the inquiry reports, –the National Association of LINk 
Members (NALM) “condemned” proposals to strip Local Healthwatch of its statutory 
body status and establish it as a non-statutory ‘corporate body’ - claiming the proposal 
will “massively undermine the power and influence of Local Healthwatch.” Malcolm 
Alexander, Chair of NALM said  
If the statutory status of Local Healthwatch is removed, it will lose significant 
influence and power. A high percentage of LINks will simply disappear in the 
complexity of the transitional arrangements. By removing the statutory status 
from Local Healthwatch the Government are in practice abolishing LINks and 
reneging on their promise of an “evolution” to Healthwatch. We are also dismayed 
that the status, power and influence of LHW will be reduced and undermined if it 
loses the statutory component – even if retaining some ‘statutory duties’. For an 
organisation populated by local volunteers and the public, expected to influence 
professional bodies such as commissioners and providers of services, that 
statutory label is pivotal to gaining meaningful access and exert real and genuine 
influence on the NHS and social care services.”117 (NALM. February 1st 2012.)  
Governments of both complexions over the last decade have fragmented and under-
resourced complaints advocacy services, and patient and public involvement in health 
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services. It appears the obstacles to creating them as integrated, properly resourced and 
become independent powerful advocates may be as large as ever. 
Risk rating: red  
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13. The nature, scope and definition of a duty of candour 
and methods of enforcing it. 
 
In order to encourage or require openness and transparency patients groups have been 
campaigned for a “duty of candour”. The need for more robust means of preventing a 
climate of denial and bullying was raised at numerous points during the Inquiry.  
The Inquiry Counsel agreed: 
97. It should be made clear to all that a Trust’s “best interests” require full 
disclosure when things go wrong.  
26. A duty of candour should apply not only to clinicians but to organisations 
314. Health care providers and those working within them should be subject to a 
duty of candour.  
The idea of a legal “duty of candour” was first suggested by chief medical officer Sir Liam 
Donaldson in a review of the clinical negligence scheme in 2003. He told the inquiry he 
supported a duty of candour but said it had to be handled in “a way that’s as positive as 
possible”.118 (Public Inquiry. 20th September 2011). 
The DH proposes that all organisations providing services to the NHS will be 
contractually obliged to inform patients and relatives if a mistake has been made under 
proposals set out by the government. A ‘duty of candour’ would be written into the NHS 
Standard Contracts requiring organisations to be open about where a mistake has 
caused moderate or severe harm or death. The DH prefers a “contractual mechanism” 
for introducing such a duty on the basis that the alternative statutory duty would require 
a national mechanism for enforcing compliance where the only realistic candidate for the 
role is the CQC which has stated it would be unable routinely to monitor and enforce the 
duty. It is unclear how a contractual mechanism will result in robust enforcement.119 
(Action against Medical Accidents. September 2012)  
Those with experience of aviation, where incident reporting is highly developed, stress 
that such a duty should not result in disciplinary action when the practitioner commits 
an inadvertent human error and reports it to their employer, and argue that only 
“reckless or grossly negligent behaviour that organisational norms or situational stress 
are unable to explain alone” should trigger potential disciplinary action.120 (Clinical 
Human Factors Group. November 5th 2011)  
Arguably, such a duty of candour will only be effective if health service providers 
transform their management culture internally rather than simply relying on external 
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inspection or professional regulators. However if there were to be no effective external 
inspection and professional regulators fail to hold senior managers to account and 
support those who comply with their Code of Conduct by raising concerns, then a duty of 
candour risks being another process for employers to try to sidestep their safety duties. 
Risk rating: amber/red 
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14. The development, collection, use and sharing of 
information and data, including safety alerts, mortality data 
and performance indicators.  
 
More than a decade ago, the Institute of Medicine’s landmark report To Err Is Human121 
(Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson. 2000) claimed between 44, 
000 and 98,000 Americans die in hospitals each year due to medical errors. In the UK 
more than 20 per cent of patients suffer avoidable harm during their care at some trusts. 
The NHS Safety Thermometer “reveals that nine per cent of all NHS patients have 
suffered an avoidable harm. This means major improvements are required if the NHS is 
to meet the Department of Health’s target to deliver “harm-free care” to 95 per cent of 
patients “by 2012”.”122 (David Williams. 30 August, 2012). Leading US authorities 
explained 
“No one wants a single person to be harmed by medical care. Eliminating patient 
injuries is difficult, even with the best of intentions. Solutions such as ‘wash your 
hands’, ‘give the antibiotic on time’ and ‘use the checklist’ seem so simple that 
many ask, ‘How could they not do that?’ In fact putting these solutions into action 
is elusive, requiring culture changes, new forms of teamwork, uncomfortable […] 
transparency, disclosure, dialogue, changes in patterns of workflow, and constant 
vigilance at all levels.”123 (Joseph McCannon, AB; Donald M. Berwick, MD. 
(2011)).  
The Inquiry heard there is substantial evidence that the use of standard procedures, 
especially where the organisation itself enthusiastically monitors, prevents harm and 
improves quality, improve safe care, and so is likely to recommend that 
17. There is a need for far greater standardisation of operating (or quality) 
standards in the NHS with close monitoring of compliance.  
317. The publication and transparency of date is a profoundly important factor in 
driving performance and exposing poor quality care  
The use of NICE to create Quality Standards for the use of providers, commissioners and 
regulators in assessing and promoting safe and high quality care has been welcomed.  
There is growing evidence that systematic recording allied to checklists improves 
performance and safety.124 (Hales BM, Pronovost PJ, 2006)  
Numerous shortcomings in the existing data arrangements were highlighted during the 
inquiry which heard that the National Reporting and Learning System was delayed for 
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several years after it was first recommended, whilst Sir Liam Donaldson said the 
reporting of patient safety incidents mandatory was not made mandatory after he said 
he had been “warned” that doctors would not report.125 (Public Inquiry. 19th September 
2011). Professor Brian Jarman warned that Trusts may try to deceive regulators and 
gave as a possible example the way in which patients with diabetes and rheumatoid 
arthritis were coded as being under palliative care to reduce published death rates.126 
(Public Inquiry. 13 June 2011). 
Sir Bruce Keogh told the Inquiry that the National Patient Safety Agency’s National 
Reporting and Learning System, which will become the responsibility of the NHS 
Commissioning Board when the Agency is abolished, is likely to be outsourced to an 
“NHS trust with an academic interest”.127 (Trust Public Inquiry. 20 September 2011). It 
is unclear what evidence that such changes would improve health care underpinned this 
decision. 
It is unclear how powerful the Care Quality Commission’s new “quality risk profiles, 
which bring together information about health and social care providers from a range of 
sources, will be.128 (Public Inquiry. 28 September 2011). 
Tom Kark QC’s closing submission reminded the Inquiry that: 
 
151. What is also striking about the 2006 report is that it was the product of a 
single day’s visit by volunteers, and yet provided a very clear account of the risks 
posed by the trust’s A and E department which otherwise seems to have escaped 
effective scrutiny until 2008. 
166. It is critical in our submission that the regular has sufficient access about 
complaints to allow them to identify trends which may indicate poor standards 
There is some evidence that public reporting of data on quality (when benchmarked) can 
have a powerful effect on the reputation of organisations and individuals 129 (The Health 
Foundation. 2009). Anna Dixon, Catherine Foot, Tony Harrison (2011) point out130: 
High performing organisations find that one ‘habit’ they have in common is 
measurement and oversight. While for many organisations measurement is 
driven by external audiences such as regulators and payers, among these high-
performing organisations measurement is for purposes such as internal 
accountability and performance management. Those organisations go beyond the 
measures required for external reporting.  
Risk rating: Amber 
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15. The protection of whistle-blowers. 
 
There is widespread concern that whistleblowers, an essential catalyst for creating safe 
care, are tolerated at best and victimised at worst in too many NHS organisations.131 
(Roger Kline. 13 December 2011) This is not for want of instruction, guidance and 
rhetoric from the DH and others.  
Speak up for a healthy NHS 
The Health Service Circular 1999/198132 (DH 1999) required every NHS trust and health 
authority to have in place policies and procedures which comply with the PIDA set out 
employers’ obligations and staff rights. Speak up for a Healthy NHS133 (DH and NHS 
Social Partnership Forum. 2010) urged employers to have good policies and practice in 
place. NHS Employers, together with regulators and trade unions issued an updated 
version of this (The Speaking Up Charter) but it remains to be seen whether this has 
greater effect than previous declarations of good intent. 134 (NHS Employers. 2012). 
Guidance for GPs was issued following the Shipman Inquiry report135. (Public Concern at 
Work. 2003) The then Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, published an 
updated NHS Constitution in March 2012 stressing the responsibility of staff to report 
concerns and of employers to act on them, but did not introduce any additional statutory 
obligations on employers.136 (DH. March 2012). 
The changes include: 
• an expectation that staff should raise concerns at the earliest opportunity  
• a pledge that NHS organisations should support staff when raising concerns by 
ensuring their concerns are fully investigated and that there is someone 
independent, outside of their team, to speak to  
• clarity around the existing legal right for staff to raise concerns about safety, 
• malpractice or other wrong doing without suffering any detriment 
Following all this guidance, the 2010 NHS staff survey found that staff are more aware of 
their organisation’s policies and process for reporting concerns, and that they understand 
how to raise concerns about risks to patient safety, with 80% saying their "trust 
encourages us to report errors, near misses, or incidents". Despite this, only a minority 
(41%) of staff say their trusts "treats staff who are involved in an error, near miss, or 
incident fairly." 137 (DH. 2011). 
Another survey reported that: 
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More than a third of nurses (34%) said they have been discouraged or told 
directly not to report their concerns about quality of care. Some 73% said 
managers had told them not to speak up, while 24% said work colleagues had 
said it was a bad.138 (Nursing Times. 5 December 2011).  
The draft Standards for members of NHS boards and governing bodies in England139 
(2012, CHRE) says Board members must demonstrate business skills, such as “being 
open about the evidence, reasoning and reasons behind decisions about budget and 
resource allocation, and contract allocation in particular” and “taking appropriate action 
to raise concerns if I perceive that my organisation or my colleagues are engaging in any 
harmful behaviour or misconduct”. 
The Inquiry Chair has stated he regards protection for whistleblowers as a priority in his 
forthcoming report and will expect employers and regulators to act accordingly. However 
the Government’s recent refusal to endorse detailed proposals to improve PIDA from 
Public Interest at Work, and the NHS Confederation’s decision to exclude whistleblowing 
organisations from their recent summit on the subject does not bode well. Despite the 
DH and Ministerial assurances of the importance of whistleblowing, when recently given 
the opportunity to improve the Public Interest Disclosure Act, Ministers headed for the 
hills. In June 2012 Ministers sought to amend the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 
to tighten Section 14 so that disclosures would not be protected unless believed to be 
made in the public interest, a move widely regarded as placing a further obstacle in the 
way of whistleblowers. There was no public consultation into this proposed amendment 
so the views of trade unions, UK business and other interested groups were not taken 
into account when the Government drafted their amendment. This also represents a 
missed opportunity to take a wider look at the legislation’s success and failures which 
could in turn lead to further reforms that would improve the legislation. This led to Katy 
Clark MP putting forward an Early Day Motion EDM (359) calling for a public consultation 
as follows: 
“That this House believes greater protection should be provided to whistleblowers 
in the workplace; is alarmed at the Court of Appeal's decision in NHS Manchester 
v Fecitt & Ors which indicates that employees are no longer protected from 
harassment of co-workers; believes that this is just one of a number of issues, 
including the implementation of the Shipman Inquiry's recommendations to 
remove the good faith test, and the use of gagging clauses which requires serious 
debate; believes that the changes put forward in the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Bill will make it more difficult for individuals to rely on the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act and calls on the Government to hold a wider consultation on 
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possible reforms to ensure a meaningful strengthening of the protection of 
whistleblowers.”140 (Public Concern at Work. 26 July 2012).  
 
Risk rating: red 
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Additional concerns likely to affect implementation of 
recommendations 
There are significant issues are not listed in the topics Robert Francis QC has said he is 
likely to consider - notably the implications of the Health and Social Care Act, the likely 
decisive increase in private sector NHS provision, the role of trade unions and the role of 
Government, all briefly considered here.  
The implications of the Health and Social Care Act 
The Faculty of Public Health's risk assessment of the Act141 (Faculty of Public Health 
2012) warned of:  
• Loss of a comprehensive Health service,  
• Increased costs,  
• Reduced quality of care,  
• Widening health inequalities 
The Faculty of Public Health risk register claims that increased competition, a more overt 
focus on anti-competitive behaviour and a multiplicity of service providers and 
commissioners may result not only in a range of increased costs but in reduced quality of 
care 
 
• “Supplier induced demand - danger of over treatment and harm to patients of 
unnecessary invasive procedures as demonstrated by research in the US.  
• Currently the national tariff covers less than 60% of NHS services. Services 
not covered by a national tariff will be open to competition on price. 
Competition on price will encourage a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the 
quality of care.  
• tendering processes service specifications will need to be ’water tight’ in terms 
of quality standards – CCGs lack the expertise and resources to develop 
contracts that will ensure quality standards are maintained or enhanced. 
There are also difficulties in measuring quality and setting standards that do 
not generate perverse incentives. 
• Co-ordination of care may be seen as anti-competitive unless it can be clearly 
demonstrated that providers collaborating to provide services is in the best 
interests of the patient. 
• Medical negligence QC John Whitting claims negligence claims may soar as a 
result of competitive commissioning. Competition and commercial interests 
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lead to fewer clinical staff working longer hours, and create an environment in 
which mistakes are most likely to happen. 
• Quality of patient care will be compromised if competing providers are 
unwilling to share information such as test results, medications etc and co-
ordinate services.” 
 
Those risks are compounded by widespread concerns about the capacity of Clinical 
Commissioning Groups to effectively commission quality services more general concerns 
about accountability in the new system. Jo Maybin and colleagues142 warn (2011).   
 
Overall, we think the proposed reforms signal a shift to an over-reliance on weak 
and unproven accountability relationships given the extent of the government’s 
proposed reforms; this is a significant cause for concern.  
 
Privatisation 
The implications of a likely exponential growth in private sector provision was not 
addressed by the Inquiry, presumably because it was not an issue at Mid Staffordshire 
itself and because the Inquiry report preceded the implementation of the Health and 
Social Care Act. Nevertheless, the increased role of the private sector in healthcare may 
well have fundamental implications for implementation of many of his recommendations.  
Not only is there no evidence that hospital competition, at the heart of the Act, saves 
lives,143 (Cooper Z, Gibbons S, Jones S, McGuire A. 2011) but it is unclear how co-
operation and the integration of care sit alongside competition between providers. 
 
The Inquiry chair in closing the Inquiry said he hoped his recommendations would help 
those “charged with planning and managing the ever-shifting” NHS but stressed it was 
not intended to halt any reforms or changes currently underway.144 (Public Inquiry. 
Closing submission. December 2011). 
The NHS is regarded as one of the fairest and most cost-effective healthcare systems in 
the world with half the per capita costs of the US health system145 (Randeep Ramesh. 
August 7th 2011). At a time of sharp “efficiency savings” and rising demand, funding will 
inevitably be a central issue in improving patient safety and promoting good care. There 
is a real risk that, just as Cecil Clothier produced a thorough report following the 
Beverley Allitt Inquiry146 (Sir Cecil Clothier. February 1994) but one which did not 
challenge the overall framework and funding within which deaths occurred, there is a 
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real risk that if the Inquiry does not seek fundamental changes to the framework of 
health care provision and delivery that the Health and Social Care Act introduced (which 
it will not) then its best intentions will be frustrated. 
Allyson Pollock147 (Allyson Pollock. August 27th 2012) suggests one challenge to 
commissioners and regulators is that “Fraudulent billing and embezzlement will become 
endemic”. She highlights fraud and mischarging convictions against HCA International 
and Unitedhealth and writes: 
As for public accountability, there is none. Commercial contracts are redacted so 
that crucial financial information is not in the public domain. Government 
departments and companies refuse to release the necessary information on the 
grounds of commercial confidentiality and allows companies to sequester their 
profits in offshore tax havens 
 
Despite the Secretary of State claiming ”I do not think that we will see a big expansion 
in the number of private sector providers” arising from the Health and Social Care Act,148  
(Hansard. 16 Mar 2011) there will surely need to be an increase in the budgets of those 
organisations expected to monitor and ensure the safety of such providers. The CQC's 
£164m annual budget was 30 per cent below the combined funding of the bodies it 
replaced in 2009, though its duties were greater. It even had to ask the Department of 
Health for an extra £15m to deal with a rise in whistle-blowing calls following the 
Panorama programme on abuse at Winterbourne View.149 (Health Select Committee. 28 
June 2011).  
 
Trade Unions 
Some individual trade union members, and at least one local representative, acted with 
real credit in Mid Staffordshire. However trade unions as organisations do not emerge 
well from the Inquiry proceedings: 
75. The evidence of Adrian Legan (RCN full time officer) suggests that the Royal 
College of Nursing may have been out of touch with its membership and the 
Trusts poor incident reporting culture. 
78. The unions were effective at representing their members particularly when 
protecting rights guaranteed by employment legislation. They were less effective 
in representing their members’ interest in ensuring patient safety and a high 
quality of care.  
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79. There was some evidence that in protecting their members employment 
rights the unions assumed they were protecting patients e.g. Mr. Legan’s 
evidence that as there were no compulsory redundancies he was reassured that 
the workforce reduction had not made patients less safe. 
84. The RCN’s chief executive did not engage with the presence of the quality 
regulator (the Healthcare Commission) at the Trust and did not communicate with 
it. This led to the public receiving potentially confusing messages about the 
standard of care at the trust.  
85. A leading official of Unison gave wrong and confused evidence about 
whistleblowing in the NHS, suggesting its relative unimportance to that union at a 
national level. The Chairman will no doubt wish to consider recommendations 
designed to embed in healthcare unions a culture of raising concerns about 
unsafe and poor quality care.  
86. The brief evidence from the BMA suggested that doctors are even less likely 
than nurses to raise concerns about unsafe and poor quality care.  
The Inquiry heard that at the height of the Trust failures the leader of the biggest 
nursing union wrote to Mid Staffordshire’s director of nursing Helen Moss in May 2008 
stating: 
"I was very impressed with the standard of nursing care. As you know, I have 
visited trusts throughout the UK and I have seldom been as impressed with the 
quality of care as I witnessed at the Stafford Hospital ……. It was useful to have 
the opportunity to speak with patients and their relations, all of whom could not 
have been more fulsome in their praise of the standard of care."150 (Public 
Inquiry. 7 March 2012). 
The Inquiry’s concerns about the inability of trade unions to be effective advocates for 
staff on patient safety issues at Mid Staffordshire ought to prompt serious reflection 
amongst members and leaders alike. In reflecting on the Inquiry, trade unions might 
want to take into account that, in this author’s own experience, there exists a more 
general challenge of developing ways of ensuring trade unions are effective guardians of 
the public interest and their members’ duty of care at local level across all sectors of 
industry. Trade union members are also patients, relatives and carers. The continuing 
fall in membership and the “hollowing out” of local representative structures make such 
reflection imperative if the concluding paragraph of the Inquiry’s closing submission from 
Tom Kark is to be addressed: 
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99. Unions such as Unison and the Royal College of Nursing failed to detect or 
communicate failings of care at the Trust despite being in a particularly strong 
position to pick up on the experiences of their members. Unions should raise such 
concerns when they become apparent; they must be central to the quality of their 
members working environment. The unions must support those who speak out.  
 
Government policy 
 
The helpful Kings Fund Review, Preparing for the Francis report: How to assure quality in 
the NHS150 (Dixon, A. Foot, C Harrison, and T. 2011), sets out the external systems 
which the Francis report will need to address:  
 
• the registration and regulation of both providers of services and many groups of 
staff 
• the setting of standards for specific services or professional staff 
• monitoring and inspection of care provision and professional staff 
• closing down unsafe services or impose sanctions on professional staff 
• management of contracts and performance by commissioners and bodies such as 
Monitor 
• financial incentives to providers (most notably GPs) 
• patient complaints and legal claims, local authority scrutiny committees and the 
CQC may hold providers and commissioners to account  
 
However, if the Francis Inquiry report is to make a sustained difference to the likelihood 
of any repeat of the Mid Staffordshire disaster then its recommendations on these issues 
will need to be robust. But by stating in advance that its Report will not challenge the 
enormous reorganisation and market focus of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, it 
risks its recommendations being seriously undermined.  
 
The Kings Fund Review151 (Dixon, A. Foot, C Harrison, T. (2011) does not, however, 
consider the fourth factor essential to the promotion of good care and prevention of 
serious failures of quality i.e. the role of government in establishing and maintaining a 
framework to underpin and enable those goals, and the provision of sufficient funding to 
enable staff to realistically deliver those goals. The widespread concerns that the Health 
and Social Care Act will undermine that fourth factor, and the Government’s insistence 
on finding a staggering 4 per cent efficiency savings per year for the next four years, 
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threaten to fatally undermine the Francis Report even if the other three factors were 
effectively addressed. 
Such concerns will have been underlined by Sir David Nicholson whose recent speech. 
Almost valedictory in nature, welcomed his Secretary of State as follows: 
The head of the NHS has laid bare his fears that the government's controversial 
reforms of the health service could end in "misery and failure". 
Sir David Nicholson, chief executive of the NHS, said high-profile, politically 
driven changes almost always end in disaster. He warned against "carpet 
bombing" the NHS with competition but said that competition was best used like 
a "rifle shot" to fix problems.152 (Daniel Boffey 13 October 2012) 
 
Conclusion 
It is hard to be optimistic about the difference the Francis Report will make even if its 
recommendations are as robust as they are likely to be. 
The risk rating identified for each of the fifteen key areas of likely recommendations this 
Paper has considered are summarised in Fig 2.  
Fig 2. Summary risk ratings 
Risk rating Number of areas of likely 
recommendations 
Red indicates serious adverse consequences 
 
9 
Amber/Red indicates moderate/serious adverse 
consequences 
 
3 
Amber indicates moderate/adverse consequences 
 
3 
Green indicates no adverse consequences 
 
0 
 
These are no more than the most approximate indicators of risk, but they suggest that 
overall, the impact of Ministerial response to the Inquiry Report, is problematic. Ministers 
and the DH are unlikely to openly resist most recommendations, but certain key 
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recommendations can expect to be “kicked into the long grass” or diluted to such an 
extent that their impact is limited, whilst the impact of the Health and Social Care Act 
appears to not be a factor in the Inquiry recommendations. The report has already been 
delayed since its first suggested publication date and it is unclear whether the 
Government response will demonstrate the urgency, let alone the policy response, 
required.153 (HC Deb, 8 October 2012). If either (or both) happen then the potential 
risks identified will become real ones and a repetition of the systemic failings identified 
at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust will remain a continuing possibility, the more 
likely because of the financial, policy and structural turmoil now underway. 
October 2012  
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